A nonpublic Russian roadmap charts deeper cooperation with Iran across banking, nuclear power and aviation as both governments seek protection from Western pressure.
Fox News Digital obtained the 44-page Russian government plan, which assigns agencies and state companies projects running through the end of 2026.
Russia approved its side of the plan on Sept. 2, 2024. The roadmap covers finance, nuclear energy, oil and gas, aircraft parts and transportation links between Russia and Iran.
The goal is broader than any single deal. The document seeks to reduce weak points created by sanctions and Western economic pressure through alternative systems, suppliers and trade routes.
Keti Korkiya, a research analyst with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Russia program, said the projects themselves have long been visible. She said the more telling feature was “the architecture of the relationship Moscow is trying to build.”
The roadmap calls for more bilateral trade in Russian and Iranian currencies. It set a target of 68% in 2024 and 71% by 2026.
It also directs the Bank of Russia and the Central Bank of Iran to develop central bank digital currencies for cross-border payments. The two sides were assigned to pursue independent systems for sending financial messages between banks.
By February 2025, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk said the countries had shifted almost all bilateral settlements into their national currencies. Iran’s ambassador to Russia said the countries no longer needed the SWIFT banking network for their dealings.
The ambassador said Moscow and Tehran were using confidential bank-messaging systems. He also said an initial link between Iran’s Shetab payment network and Russia’s Mir system had begun during the prior year.
A U.S. official said American sanctions had “severely isolated Russia and Iran from the international financial system.” The official called their search for alternative channels and sanctions workarounds “not surprising.”
Washington’s answer is that parallel systems cannot match what Moscow and Tehran are trying to escape. The U.S. official said they “cannot replicate the reach, liquidity or trust of the U.S. dollar and the international financial system.”
The document also calls for diplomatic coordination through BRICS and other international bodies against trade restrictions. That turns a set of practical workarounds into a broader campaign against sanctions policy itself.
Russia’s state nuclear company, Rosatom, received continuing duties at Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant. Those tasks cover fuel, maintenance and construction-related work.
The roadmap assigns Rosatom responsibility for work at Bushehr Unit 1 and construction tied to Units 2 and 3. That makes nuclear cooperation a continuing part of the relationship rather than a stand-alone project.
On Sept. 2, 2026, Rosatom said Russian specialists had started returning to Bushehr. Unit 1 was preparing for scheduled maintenance and partial fuel replacement, while more specialists were expected.
Rosatom also said fuel had been delivered. The update came exactly two years after Russia approved its side of the cooperation plan.
A European intelligence source described the documents as nonpublic and high-level. The source said they showed cooperation in sensitive fields, including nuclear programs, energy trade and financial transactions intended to evade U.S. sanctions.
The document itself uses more guarded language. It frames the financial and political effort as resistance to unilateral restrictions rather than calling it sanctions evasion.
Russia’s Energy Ministry received responsibility for advancing projects at Iran’s Shadegan, Kish and North Pars oil and gas fields. The roadmap also assigned roles to other Russian agencies and interested companies.
The Shadegan project carried milestones through the end of 2025. On Feb. 13, 2026, the Russian news agency Interfax reported that state-owned ZN-Vostok was developing the field.
Those assignments show how the plan works. Russia did not merely endorse closer ties in broad terms. It named agencies, projects and deadlines across industries.
Korkiya said no single initiative would remake the relationship. Taken together, however, she said the projects aimed “to remove single points of vulnerability and build redundancy into the Russia-Iran economic relationship.”
That is the central design. If sanctions squeeze one channel, Moscow and Tehran want another channel ready in finance, transportation, energy or industrial production.
The aviation section directs Russian authorities to identify aircraft parts that Iranian companies could repair or produce. Russia’s aviation regulator, Rosaviatsiya, was assigned to identify capable plants and certify selected sites.
The roadmap set March 31, 2026, as the deadline for an agreement on producing Russian aircraft components in Iran. It targeted Dec. 31, 2026, for the start of prototype production.
Fox News Digital had not independently established whether the manufacturing plan was carried out. The deadlines show intent, but the document alone does not prove production began.
Other aviation cooperation had moved forward. Rosaviatsiya’s chief said in February 2025 that three Iranian companies had gained approval to conduct maintenance and airworthiness work on Russian-operated aircraft.
Russian authorities also publicly discussed aircraft manufacturing and joint work with Iran on passenger-plane jet engines that month. An Aeroflot Airbus A330 underwent maintenance in Tehran as well.
For two governments facing Western pressure, aircraft repair and local parts production offer another layer of insulation. The plan seeks alternatives where access to outside suppliers may be limited.
Transportation is another major part of the roadmap. It includes the Rasht-Astara railway, a roughly 162-kilometer missing link inside Iran.
The proposed route would help connect the area near Iran’s border with Azerbaijan to Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf. Russia’s Transport Ministry said engineering surveys formally began in May 2025.
But progress had limits. Korkiya said by late summer 2026 that the project had not reached full construction.
The plan also looks north to Astrakhan, Russia. It calls for an Iranian-invested terminal, warehouses, a logistics park and facilities tied to grain and vegetable oil.
Together, those projects would give trade between the two countries more physical routes. Banking alternatives have less value if goods, parts and fuel cannot move reliably.
The roadmap is not proof that every project succeeded. Some financial arrangements remain confidential, several participating companies are unnamed, and the aircraft-production plan had not been independently established.
Still, the document provides a detailed view of how Moscow organized the effort. Rosatom, the Bank of Russia, the Energy Ministry and Rosaviatsiya each received defined responsibilities.
The plan also ties those duties to dates extending through 2026. That structure separates it from a diplomatic statement filled with general promises.
A European intelligence source said the strategy showed that Russia and Iran remained closely aligned. The source assessed that Russia aimed to increase its cooperation with Iran during 2026.
Korkiya also pointed beyond the immediate business deals. She said the roadmap included “an effort to build an intellectual and diplomatic campaign against sanctions themselves.”
The U.S. official rejected the idea that those efforts would blunt American sanctions. But the roadmap shows Moscow and Tehran are investing time, agencies and state companies in trying.
Western pressure works best when it leaves hostile governments with fewer options. Moscow and Tehran are methodically trying to create more of them.
